Defender's Mindset

Monday, October 29, 2018

Yet Another Case Study: Pittsburgh, October 27 2018

The latest tragedy occurred at the Tree of Life synagogue in the Shadyside neighborhood of Pittsburgh.

11 people were killed and six wounded by a man who had no prior interactions with law enforcement or any mental health system, had guns purchased legally, and exhibited no overt signs that would suggest a pending attack.

Investigators will be sifting through evidence and testimony for a while, but a few facts have been established about this incident:

The assailant walked unimpeded through an unlocked exterior door
The assailant retreated back into the target area after encountering responding law enforcement
No one inside could or would counter the force wielded by the assailant
Evacuations to hide locations kept some out of the line of fire
The assailant's position inside the facility delayed medical first responders
Most injuries and fatal wounds happened within five minutes of the assailant's initial attack
A 911 call was placed two minutes after the first shots fired
Local LEO responded "immediately," but it's not clear how many, what type, and how long before responding officers engaged the assailant
The assailant was armed with multiple weapons, including one long gun and three handguns
The assailant acted alone
The attack was stopped when the assailant received return fire (e.g was met with equal force)

Some conclusions based on these facts:

Access control is critical: unlocked, unattended doors permit malefactors immediate access to targets
Law Enforcement response is after a crime is committed. We are on our own until police and medical responders arrive and take control of the scene. Therefore, a two-minute response time on scene is fast -- but meaningless if it takes 10 minutes to secure the space.
Hiding can be effective, especially if response is swift. Exiting the facility is usually the best option, but hiding is next best. Any civilian responders inside the building should move in such a way as to prevent the attacker from encountering those in hide positions.
An attacker with multiple weapons is carrying several because he/she is unable to rapidly reload. The time required to change firearms (especially if they are different) is longer than a magazine change for even experienced shooters. It is also likely that the attacker will need several shots to adjust from a rifle to a handgun. This transition period is likely the best time to engage an attacker.
Any lethal force response to an attacker will slow or even stop the attack (whether of not the attacker is hit). According to FBI Active Shooter research, the majority of attackers immediately cease when engaged, hit, or succumb to self-inflicted wounds.

Bottom Line: Enange an attacker with lethal force as soon as practicable while maintaining protection of unarmed civilians in hide or escape positions.

Saturday, October 27, 2018

Springfield Armory Range Officer 5" .45 ACP 1911-A1 Review

The last time I fired a 1911-A1 was around 1990, one of the few still in the inventory of the Army National Guard. It rattled like spoons in a bag. When I asked about the rattle I was told "It's worn-out...”

(Of course that's not correct, but I doubt the sergeant issuing the weapons knew any better. I certainly didn't. Plus, tankers lump military sidearms with bayonets and gas masks -- annoying, unnecessary gear that only to adds weight and turn-in cleaning time. So handgun qualification was a required formality that simply got in the way of real training).

US Government Issue M1911A1 and Holster

After a dalliance with .40 caliber Glocks, my civilian carry choice shifted to 9mm due to the availability and price of practice ammo, the capacity of 9mm magazines and the quality and ergonomics of the small, concealable 9mm handguns becoming available (such as the 2006 Smith and Wesson M&P9c, and the 2007 Walther PPS).

While the newer guns are nice, if you're an American interested in handguns you really need a 1911 that fires .45 ACP. John Browning's 1911 is the sine qua non of American handheld firepower. In these times of American resurgence, doesn't it make sense to load and shoot .45 ACP? And shouldn't those .45 230 grain FMJ bullets travel through the barrel of a 1911-A1?

Of course.

John Moses Browning wants you to own a 1911. Listen to John Moses Browning.

It doesn't take long to be overwhelmed by the variety of current 1911 choices: Wilson Combat, Les Baer, Dan Wesson, Colt, Sig Sauer, Smith and Wesson, Kimber, Springfield Armory, and many others.

We are living in the golden age of 1911, with many, many excellent builders.

After many hours viewing various models and eventually adjusting to fiscal realities (superfine quality isn't cheap!), I settled on either a Kimber or Springfield Armory.

Eventually, Springfield Armory (SA) won me over to the Range Officer (RO) with its parkerized finish, standard features, and no-nonsense look.

It helped that each model was the bottom on the cost scale, but I would rather buy a quality foundation and add the custom items I want, rather than paying upfront for items the vendor thinks I might want. The consensus among the more knowledgeable is that a SA RO is a good base from which to build up. The fundamentals are there.

So I plunked down an order with SportsmansOutdoorSuperstore.com on Friday. The following Wednesday the SA Range Officer arrived at my favorite FFL (Charlie Smithgall, former mayor of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, cannon enthusiast, and pharmacist).

I took it home, opened up the very nice case, and was pleased to see a very large, very utilitarian-looking pistol. The RO is no display piece -- the Parkerized finish means business.

According to Calvan, a company that sells parkerizing kits,"Parkerizing or Phosphating is a Metal Finish that really gained in popularity during WW2 when the US Government was looking to replace the typical blued finish on most small arms with a Rust Resistant and Anti Reflective Finish that would be both Durable and Abrasion Resistant and hold up in all weather extremes, for this they chose Parkerizing or Phosphating."

NOTE: It's important to note that Parkerizing is intended to be oiled, but this is not mentioned in the SA Owners Manual. I have been using CLP and it seems to be working fine.

The pistol feels right in the hand. The longer, higher beavertail is welcome over the MIL-SPEC original. The grips are very nice. The sights are -- fine. But I plan to to replace them.

After a few hours getting familiar with the firearm I re-learned how to tear it down (simple, once you get it). I cleaned everything, put it back together, function-checked, and got ready to head to the range.

I'll write up a range report in a follow-up post.

FBI Report Confirms Concealed Carry Permit Holders End Armed Attacks and Avoid Shooting Bystanders

In the FBI the report entitled "Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2016 and 2017," five incidents are acknowledged to have been ended by a Concealed Carry permit holder (not Law Enforcement or Armed Security):

Schlenker Automotive (Commerce)

On November 17, 2017, at 4:30 p.m., Robert Lorenzo Bailey, Jr., 28, armed with a handgun, allegedly began shooting in the parking lot of Schlenker Automotive in Rockledge, Florida. The manager of the auto repair shop and an employee, both possessing valid firearms permits, exchanged gunfire with the shooter. One person was killed; one was wounded. The shooter, shot twice during the exchange, was held at gunpoint by the manager until law enforcement arrived and took him into custody.

First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas (House of Worship)

On November 5, 2017, at 11:20 a.m., Devin Patrick Kelley, 26, armed with a rifle, exited his vehicle and began shooting outside the First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas. He then entered the church and continued shooting at members of the congregation. The shooter exited the church and was confronted by a citizen who possessed a valid firearms permit. The citizen shot the shooter twice, causing the shooter to drop his rifle and flee the scene in his vehicle. The armed citizen, together with the owner of a pickup truck, pursued the shooter. The chase ended when the shooter’s vehicle struck a road sign and overturned. Twenty-six people were killed; 20 were wounded. The shooter committed suicide with a handgun he had in his vehicle before police arrived.

Townville Elementary School (Education)

On September 28, 2016, at 1:45 p.m., Jesse Dewitt Osborne, 14, armed with a handgun, allegedly began shooting at the Townville Elementary School playground in Townville, South Carolina. Prior to the shooting, the shooter, a former student, killed his father at their home. Two people were killed, including one student; three were wounded, one teacher and two students. A volunteer firefighter, who possessed a valid firearms permit, restrained the shooter until law enforcement officers arrived and apprehended him.

Burnette Chapel Church of Christ (House of Worship)

On September 24, 2017, at 11:15 a.m., Emanuel Kidega Samson, 25, armed with two handguns, allegedly began shooting in the parking lot of the Burnette Chapel Church of Christ in Antioch, Tennessee. After killing one person, the shooter entered the church and shot six people. A citizen who attempted to subdue the shooter was pistol-whipped. During the altercation, the shooter accidently shot himself. While the shooter was preoccupied, the citizen, who possessed a valid firearms permit, retrieved a handgun from his car and held the shooter at gunpoint until law enforcement arrived. One person was killed; seven were wounded. The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement.

Multiple Locations in Clearlake Oaks, California (Commerce)

On October 23, 2017, at 11:23 a.m., Alan Ashmore, 61, armed with a shotgun and a handgun, allegedly began firing into several homes and a vehicle in Clearlake Oaks, California, killing two people, including his father, and wounding one. Another person was wounded while fleeing out of a residence window. The shooter then shot and wounded a responding law enforcement officer before fleeing in his vehicle. The shooter drove to a nearby gas station and exchanged gunfire with the vendor, who possessed a valid firearms permit. The shooter fled the scene in his vehicle and drove to another gas station where he fired more shots.

Sister Marie Lenahan Wellness Center (Health Care)

On July 24, 2014, at 2:20 p.m., Richard Steven Plotts, 49, armed with a handgun entered his psychiatrist’s office at Sister Marie Lenahan Wellness Center in Darby, Pennsylvania, and began shooting, killing his caseworker and wounding his doctor. The doctor, who possessed a valid firearms permit, returned fire. One person was killed; 1 was wounded. Employees restrained the wounded shooter until law enforcement arrived.

North Milwaukee Avenue, Chicago (Open Space)

On April 19, 2015, at 11:50 p.m., Everardo Custodio, 21, armed with a handgun, began shooting into a crowd of people on North Milwaukee Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. No one was killed or wounded. A citizen with a valid firearms permit shot the suspect and restrained him until law enforcement arrived and took him into custody.

Another interesting fact buried deep in this report is that NO innocent bystanders were injured or killed by a Concealed Carry Permit holder engaging and armed assailant.

Yet this list is woefully incomplete. Read this article for more cases the FBI choose not to include in the latest report.

Wednesday, May 2, 2018

Saturday, April 7, 2018

The Pitfalls of Implementing a Church Security Plan

Many churches recognize the need for security after a newsworthy event.

A few implement a plan, but too often, the plan becomes another binder on the shelf, or worse -- the planning process becomes an end in itself, generating reams of studies and procedures that are never implemented because they are too complex, resource heavy, and inflexible.

How can you avoid these dead ends?

How can you harness the expertise and energy of those in your congregation who desire to establish and serve in a security ministry?

First, be realistic. You cannot address all possible threats at all times. But you can address some threats -- start with those and then expand on the baseline.

Second, keep the committee small. Gaining consensus is easier with four than fourteen. Communication will be easier, decisions more rapid, and velocity improved.

Finally, choose implementable objectives and make them happen. Build on success and use the goodwill generated by a successful exercise to gain support for the next step.

Here is a suggested approach to successfully implementing a security approach in a local congregation:

Identify a core group of qualified, committed members and form a security subcommittee. Keep it small (2 to 5)
Develop an initial plan, then get leadership backing (best if a leader is part of the committee)
Pick realistic, achievable objectives (see examples below)
Create a security policy outline (see this post for a template)
Develop and adopt a security policy
Schedule an event (a fire drill is best – everyone knows how, it establishes an evacuation protocol, and can always be improved)
Practice, Rehearse, Walkthrough (no surprises!)
Coordinate with local LEO, Fire, EMS
Build on success
Develop and provide training tailored to your congregation
Expand the core group as interest increases and after policies and protocols are established.

Examples of realistic short-term win policies that can be instituted with minimal turmoil include:

Fire drill
Door Locking policy
Accountability (who is where)
Security awareness for ushers/ greeters

“Security” shares the problems of economics or foreign policy -- everyone has an opinion, while experts can’t satisfactorily prove one course of action is superior to another.

Therefore, it is in the best interest of the church to leave the planning and policy-making to a small group with intimate knowledge of the church, potential threats, and the range of legal and practical responses available to civilians.

Thursday, February 22, 2018

The Same Old Script

Every school shooting ends in the same sad predictable script:

"Journalists" run to the scene with cameras to shove in front of sobbing, grieving people
Network News shows scramble to create pseudo-events ("Townhall Meetings" with "Special Guests")
Politicians run to the closest camera for airtime to prove they "care" and "Want to do something about this."
The parents of the killer insist there were no signs... no indications... they can't believe it...
The psychologists, social workers, teachers, counselors, police officers, district attorneys, doctors, and druggists who interacted with the lone killer lay low.
The Government bureaucracies tasked with tracking, monitoring, and preventing mass killings disappear.
Politicians insist the failings of government require further restrictions on the citizenry.

Clearly, this is messed up.

Tuesday, February 20, 2018

Church: Unique Security Challenges

A church presents unique security challenges and concerns, as the risks to churches are more varied than private homes, businesses, or schools. For while homes, offices, and campuses require security of the occupants and property, a church survives -- and even thrives -- on good will.

Churches produce no product, provide few compensatory services, and rarely hold enough capital to operate on dividends alone. Good will -- or positive testimony or reputation -- is the primary value a church uses to maintain and sustain its ministry.

A church with an unfavorable reputation will experience a reduction in attendance, less money in donations, fewer activities, and fewer volunteers.

Over 4,000 churches close in the US annually, while barely 1,000 open, for a net loss of 3,000 fewer churches each year. See: "Statistics and Reasons for Church Decline" in Church Leadership.

While changing demographics close some churches, we can assume between a quarter to half of the closed churches reached the end after one or more events fatally damaged the reputation of the church in the community.

Therefore, the testimony of a church is an asset to be protected. This observation in a Harvard Business Review article entitled "Reputation and its Risks", while focused on business, applies to churches:

"Effectively managing reputational risk begins with recognizing that reputation is a matter of perception. A company’s overall reputation is a function of its reputation among its various stakeholders (investors, customers, suppliers, employees, regulators, politicians, nongovernmental organizations, the communities in which the firm operates) in specific categories (product quality, corporate governance, employee relations, customer service, intellectual capital, financial performance, handling of environmental and social issues). A strong positive reputation among stakeholders across multiple categories will result in a strong positive reputation for the company overall."

Most businesses can recover from a reputation setback ("New Coke," BP, Dow Chemical, Chrysler, Toyota, Chipotle) if they provide a product or service that is unique and in demand. Given the mobility of Americans in and through various churches in a lifetime, it is the rare church which can recover from a significant reputation setback.

The Tension

Churches must be welcoming to strangers, with easy access and no off-putting security checkpoints, metal detectors, or bag searches. Any church that implements heavy-handed security protocols will damage its reputation for "friendliness." Consider the TSA, one of the more maligned bureaucracies in the US federal government.

Few people rate look forward to encountering TSA. It's an annoyance that must be endured to get to something else. Many people choose alternate means of transportation just to avoid the hassles of airport security. It almost doesn't matter how pleasant the TSA person is -- the degradation of being treated as a suspect is hassle enough.

Always a Joy...

Attending church is voluntary. If we subject attendees to scrutiny -- even passive scrutiny -- they will reconsider attending. The very suggestion visible security implies -- that "no one is trustworthy" -- is abhorrent, especially in a place dedicated to relationships.

Reality

Recent events suggest security concerns are real and must be considered, for the sake of the congregation and the testimony of the church.

Sutherland Springs Baptist Church, Sutherland, Texas

These are difficult questions with no simple solutions. Still, pretending the problems do not exist will not reduce risk.

An effective church security approach must carefully weigh the impacts to various ministries, resource constraints, and visitor and member perception before imposing security protocols.

Recommendations

Establish a Security Committee

A Security committee should be constituted as a leadership subcommittee charged with developing and implementing safety and security policies, protocols, and procedures. In addition, security committee members should be able to make on-the-spot changes to procedures should conditions warrant.

The committee should be led by a board member (or qualified representative), and have representation from pastoral staff, ushers and greeters, Christian education, and any interested volunteer with law enforcement or security training and certification. While ideally, law enforcement officers participate on the committee, the committee should represent the diverse sensitivities, concerns, and interests of the church.

The committee should meet regularly and present meeting minutes and all policy recommendations to the board. The committee should also develop and present training to church staff, volunteers, and members.

Forbid Open Carry and Offensive Weapons On Church Property

Open carry by civilians (those not on official law enforcement or security duty) is pointless in a church. It causes needless concern, draws unnecessary attention to the firearm carrier, and may tarnish the testimony of the church. Acceptance of this practice by not clearly forbidding it could be construed as tacit approval.

The Security committee should develop a protocol on what to do if the policy is violated that determines how the incident should be reported and who should respond.

The church should also forbid certain classes of offensive weapons (Pennsylvania Title 18 defines "offensive weapons" as "Any bomb, grenade, machine gun, sawed-off shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches, firearm specially made or specially adapted for concealment or silent discharge, any blackjack, sandbag, metal knuckles, dagger, knife, razor or cutting instrument, the blade of which is exposed in an automatic way by switch, push-button, spring mechanism, or otherwise, any stun gun, stun baton, taser or other electronic or electric weapon or other implement for the infliction of serious bodily injury which serves no common lawful purpose.") The church can choose to permit defensive weapons such as concealed firearms by lawful permit holders, and OC sprays.

Therefore, a church should publish a policy that specifies that open carry is not permitted on church property, with exceptions for federal, state, and local law enforcement officers on duty and armed guards hired by the church

Require Certification for Security Volunteers

Unless the church requires a minimum standard prior to volunteering for church security, the church should not provide any training that recognizes concealed carry in the church. Otherwise, such training will be construed as sanctioning anyone who attends, in which case the church may be liable for any imprudent act (negligent discharge, misuse of force, brandishing) involving a firearm (or any lethal weapon, including tasers, billy clubs, knives, and pepper spray). This is a very dangerous situation, both for the church and for the volunteer.

The church should establish guidelines, conduct training events, and otherwise work with security volunteers to ensure consistency of mission and methods.

The church should establish minimum qualifications to ensure the person is competent in the legal, ethical, and practical factors affecting the use of deterrence, de-escalation, less-than-lethal, and deadly force. This will reduce the church’s liability exposure, help ensure only qualified people respond to threats, help maintain coordination and communication during a high-pressure event, and help avoid (but not guarantee) potential catastrophic results to life and testimony.

Those who volunteer will be best served by acquiring certification recognized as the standard for armed security guards in the locality. This establishes a minimum threshold, aligns with private security, and helps raise the level of care established by the church.

Most certified armed security officer programs require a psychological exam, a physical exam, and a criminal background check. The church should have its own vetting process that ensures security volunteers maintain a commitment to the mission of the church, which may reduce the effectiveness of the security posture.

Requiring certification achieves several key objectives:

Maintains a minimum standard of training
Demonstrates the church’s commitment to adhering to a recognized standard
Acts as a barrier to entry for volunteers who are enthusiastic, but not committed or capable
Provides a legally recognized certification that helps shield against liability suits

Provide training for all volunteers on safety and security awareness

Training should be provided to help church leaders, staff, and volunteers recognize and address security risks in a way that maintains Christian testimony, accords with all jurisdictional laws, is ethically sound, minimizes overt security measures, and can be implemented within a resource-constrained environment.